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Abstract 
Effective communication helps communities to achieve common goals, but is 
especially hard to achieve in virtual adversarial collaborative communities.  In these 
communities, the matching of widely differing objectives as well as interests is very 
complex. We study a case of a virtual adversarial collaborative community in which the 
common goal was to author reports assessing the amount f true consensus on forestry 
policies. We use discourse ethics theory to derive communication norms that are a 
prerequisite for making communication in adversarial collaborative communities more 
effective.  We discuss how these norms can be used in the design of the communication 
systems supporting such communities. 
  
Introduction 
Communities are crucial for defending the public interest. Communities of cooperation need to do for 
the public good what markets currently do on behalf of aggregated private interests (Barber, 1995).  
Communities can revitalize public discourse, as Habermas, for instance, argues in his theory of 
communicative action (Debatin, 2002). These forms of civil society have discovered the bottom-up use of 
cyberspace, a space of distributed power, as a way to transform society (Sassen, 1998), making them even 
more important catalysts of societal change.   
It is often assumed that communities, virtual or not, are harmonious, at least in intent. A classic 
example are self-help patient communities, in which patients not only exchange factual information, but 
also provide emotional support by communicating with others having similar physical and emotional 
symptoms (Arnold, Leimeister, & Krcmar, 2003). However, especially for communities working for the 
public interest, this view is too naïve. In many communities, the interests of their members are, to a certain 
extent opposed. In this case, adversarial collaboration requires participants to come to agreement, and to 
work effectively together to produce a shared product that reflects the interests of the adversarial parties 
(Cohen, Cash, & Muller, 2000).  These adversarial collaborative communities play a crucial role in civil 
society. They are the bridges through which the many different stakeholders that need to be involved in 
finding solutions to complex problems related to sustainable development find common ground. If these 
communities are to be successful in their common goals, such conflicting interests are not to be suppressed, 
                                                
1 This is a revised version of the paper that won a Top Paper Award in the Communication & Technologies 
track of the 54th Annual Conference of the International Communication Association: Communication in 
the Public Interest, New Orleans, May 27-31, 2004.  
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but rather acknowledged.  Conflict is inherent in these communities, and communication support needs to 
be carefully tailored to deal with these potential sources of ineffective communication.  
What is a community? Communities are not just aggreates of people, temporarily interacting. A 
community has been defined as a group of people who share social interactions, social ties, and a commn 
'space' (Kozinets, 1999); as a social network of relationships that provide sociability support, information, 
and a sense of belonging (Wellman, 2001), and as a set of relationships where people interact socially for 
mutual benefit (Smith, 2002). The key seems to be strong and lasting interactions that bind community 
members and that take place in some form of common space. 
Of necessity, because of their international, interdisciplinary, and interactive nature, communities for 
the public interest are often virtual communities. A virtual community differs from other communities only 
in that its common space is cyberspace. Virtual communities therefore can be described as the union 
between individuals or organizations who share commn values and interests using electronic media to 
communicate within a shared semantic space on a regular basis (Schubert & Ginsburg, 2000). In virtual 
communities, the common space is provided by a suite of collaborative and communicative functionalities, 
ranging from simple mailers to advanced web applications (Preece, 2000; Wershler-Henry & Surman, 
2001). This functionality mostly consists of standard tools or components, so that information systems 
development becomes more a process of functionality selection than building whole new systems from 
scratch (Sawyer, 2001). 
With the rise of the Internet, virtual communities are gaining importance as a new model for virtual 
collaboration, as demonstrated by the proliferation of research, education, and trade communities. In an 
increasingly networked society, with an exploding need for global and flexible ways of professional 
interaction, virtual communities are natural candidates to fill collaborative gaps in traditional, hierarchical 
organizations. Research communities were the first to discover the power of the Internet to facilitate th ir 
collaboration (Harrison & Stephen, 1996). Likewise, tudent communities are natural candidates and eager 
adopters of modern networking technologies (Schubert & Koch, 2003). With the advent of more user-
friendly and powerful web applications, business is also discovering the power of virtual communities. For 
example, virtual communities of consumption are affili te groups whose online interactions are based upon 
shared enthusiasm for, and knowledge of, a specific onsumption activity or related group of activities. 
Such communities allow consumers critically to evaluate products and companies to gather valuable data 
on product characteristics from loyal customers. (Kozinets, 1999). 
All communities – physical and virtual - have at least a joint focus, and sometimes, in the case of 
collaborative communities, common goals. In communities of interest, such as many consumer 
communities, there is only a diffuse focus, which can be as vague as sharing a willingness to discuss 
common interests (Carotenuto et al., 1999). The pursuit of common objectives is much clearer in 
communities of practice. These are defined by a comm n disciplinary background, similar work activities 
and tools, and shared stories, contexts, and values (Millen, Fontaine, & Miller, 2002). As well, there is a 
tight focus on their common set of activities or practices (Carotenuto et al., 1999; Millen et al., 200 ).  
Examples of this are knowledge management communities, which act as custodians for a particular 
knowledge domain, nurturing the sharing and creation of practices and knowledge that are key to the 
achievement of both company and personal objectives (von Krogh, Nonaka, & Aben, 2001).  
Our focus in this paper is on communities of practice insofar as they can be useful instruments for 
achieving common goals. More particularly, we explore collaborative communities of practice that focus 
on the public interest. Many of such communities exist, as for example communities concerned with 
sustainable development.  These consist of a variety of experts and stakeholders, often with conflicting 
interests. The communities are very knowledge-intensive, under considerable pressures of time; forced 
because of a regular lack of resources to work most effectively and efficiently; and with rapidly evolving 
sets of goals, workflows, and organizational structures (Kleef & de Moor, 2004). These communities can
take many forms: from relatively uniform NGO communities to heterogeneous issue-networks in which 
organisations discuss a common issue (such as genetically modified food), acknowledge one another, and 
interconnect by multiple routes (Marres & Rogers, 2000). 
 Communication is the lifeblood of communities. As early pioneers in virtual communities already 
observed: “a cyberspace is defined more by the interac ions among the actors within it than by the 
technology with which it is implemented. (Morningstar & Randall Farmer, 1990)”. Of course, 
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communication is needed to coordinate actions, but it can also be a core output itself. For example, 
scholarly communities are facilitators of highly specialized forms of argumentation and debate (Rieke & 
Sillars, 1984).  Communities require a rich diversity in communication forms, from informal chatting, 
discussing, debating, asking and answering questions, and consoling, to advising and empathizing. (Preece, 
2000) 
One of the main reasons communication in communities s so important, is the development of trust. 
Trust is essential social capital in a community. I develops when there is a history of favourable past 
interactions that lead participants to expect positive future interactions (Preece, 2002).   Trustworthiness is 
not achieved overnight, but grows out of iterative processes of interaction, observation, analysis and 
judgement in which the actors are local people, outsiders, and outsiders' peers. (Chambers, 1997) 
The social norms that define these communities, for example those that help to generate trust, regulate 
what are acceptable forms of argumentation. The procedures and functionalities of their communication 
systems therefore need to be carefully adapted to the norms of virtual adversarial collaborative 
communities. However, although communication theory has provided insights into many aspects of 
effective communication in communities, these insights are hardly put into practice. And yet again, many 
communication technologies are being created and practical experiments being done in the field of 
community informatics which are little informed by or reflective of solid theoretical analysis.  
The research objective of this paper is to develop the outline of a theory of communication norms 
acting as a bridge between the two currently separate worlds of communication theory and communication 
systems design. We do so by examining the role that communication norms play in public discourse theory 
on the one hand, and by investigating the role that t ey could or should play in the design of 
communication systems on the other hand. We highlight the need for such a bridge between 
communication theory and practice by analyzing a case on group-report authoring-support systems, a 
typical example of communication systems of importance to virtual adversarial collaborative communities. 
To illustrate the problematic of systems support for effective communication in adversarial 
collaborative communities, in Sect. 2, we first introduce BCFOR, a group report authoring for 
environmental consensus assessment case. In Sect. 3, we more closely examine the public interest. Sect. 4 
introduces relevant discourse ethics theory and, for illustration, some typical communication norms deriv d 
from this theory as implemented in the GRASS tool that evolved from BCFOR.  Sect. 5 discusses how 
communication norms could inform communication systems design for virtual adversarial collaborative 
communities. We end the paper with conclusions. 
 
Effective Communication: A Case on Group Report Authoring 
In this section, we illustrate in more detail what we understand effective communication in virtual 
adversarial collaborative communities to mean. We do this by investigating the case of a typical class of 
these communities: those working for the public interest. We first present the case of a virtual community 
that aimed to produce group reports to assess the amount of consensus on forestry issues, but failed in its 
objectives due to the lack of appropriate communication support. Next, we focus on the authoring process 
and the functionality used to support this process.  Finally, we take a more theoretical perspective on the 
coordination of collaborative work in order to show the complexity of collaboration dependencies to be 
taken into account in communication support.  
Case: BCFOR 
In 1993, the Global Research Network on Sustainable Development (GRNSD)2 was formed. One of 
the objectives, stated in its Charter, was “to develop new and creative approaches to increase the quality of 
research and communication processes related to susainable development.” Although the network is no 
longer operational, it spawned a number of groups that have been operational until quite recently.  
One of these groups was the British Columbia Forests and Forestry Group (BCFOR). The group was 
formed after the government of the west coast Canadi  province of British Columbia decided to allow 
                                                
2 http://web.archive.org/web/20030705061342/infolab.uvt.nl/grnsd/ 
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clear-cut logging in the Clayoquot Sound watershed in 1993. This decision was hotly contested. The 
conflict culminated in the arrest and conviction for criminal contempt of court of hundreds of people who 
blocked the logging roads. As such, there was a heavy public interest in the case (Fig.1). To resolve th
conflict, the provincial government appointed a Scientific Panel to write a series of reports defining new 
land-use policies (SPfSFP, 1994-5). The recommendations of this panel were used to partially revise th
initial land use decision. However, many claimed that important issues were not adequately addressed in 
the final version of the reports.  
 
 
Fig. 1 Demonstration in front of B.C. Parliament Buildings, summer 1993 
 
One particular suggestion for improvement of the research approach used by the Scientific Panel was 
that there should have been more emphasis on the analysis of  contrasting issues (Hammond & Flavelle, 
1995). This seems a valid criticism, considering a tell-tale footnote remark in the 4th (March 1995) of the 
Scientific Panel reports: "The Panel's protocol is characterized by respect for one another, for different 
values, and for data founded both in scientific knowledge and traditional knowledge. This respect enabled 
the Panel to be unanimous in its recommendations" (our emphasis). (SPfSFP, 1994-5) However, if the 
values of the panel members, and the stakeholders they represent, are different, perhaps even 
incommensurable (Darling, 1995), then it is not clear at all why respect for these values would have to l ad 
to unanimity in a scientific report that aims to make a comprehensive analysis of issues and positions. To 
the contrary, highlighting such differences of opinion might usefully contribute to further policy 
deliberation and decision-making about land-use policy.   
In the BCFOR group, Canadian and international members discussed issues related to forests and 
forestry. About 15 core members were quite involved in frequent and intense interactions for at least a year 
at the peak of the conflict, turning the initially oose group into a rather tight community. The community 
consisted of a range of stakeholders, from timber industry consultants and government officials to 
environmentalists. Initially, only a mailing list discussion was conducted on issues as they were raised by 
participants. However, given their great public and personal interest in finding solutions to the crisis, the 
group members wanted to do more. It was decided after n intense e-mail discussion that the group should 
produce tangible outputs that would help improve the quality of the public debate. The common objectiv 
would be to write a series of group reports in which forestry policies could be critically analyzed in a 
systematic way.  
Group Report Authoring with GRASS 
Group reports are prime examples of dialogic text. Contrary to traditional collaborative texts, dialogic 
texts reflect the involvement of multiple authorial voices (Harrison & Stephen, 1992). This means that
conflicting opinions all find their way into the text, not covered up as compromises, but retaining their 
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original form and strength. Thus, any joint statements can be considered to have been produced in true 
consensus. This allows – or forces - policy makers to make more explicit and well-argued choices.   
BCFOR was a prototypical virtual adversarial collaborative community, in which trust could easily be 
damaged. The proposed group report authoring process wa  therefore required (by the community) to meet 
two social constraints: to be both neutral and transp rent (de Moor & Weigand, 1996). In this context, 
neutrality does not mean that individual opinions are free of bias. They cannot be. In public scientific 
investigations, not only are the authors themselves n cessarily “subjective”, but additional subjective 
constraints are imposed by society, given that society is largely based on values and value judgments 
(Lindsay, 1995). This strong subjectivity implies tha  in discussion and editorial procedures and in the 
supporting systems, all voices are to be heard through ut, and collaborating authors are not forced into
compromise. Transparency means that all processes and their outcomes should be easily observable by all 
interested stakeholders. Often, although public opini n itself is well known, public opinion formation is 
unclear (Sachs, 1995). In adversarial communities such nontransparency is unacceptable. 
After some relatively unsuccessful attempts, it turned out that using a simple mailing list for group 
report authoring purposes did not provide sufficient support. The list lacked certain technological 
functionality, but, perhaps even more importantly, it did not satisfy the complex social constraints of this 
adversarial community. To develop a better communication system, the GRASS project was conceived (de 
Moor & Aakhus, 2006; Heng & de Moor, 2003).  
The purpose of the GRASS project is to develop an are a for credible societal discourse. Its aim is to 
produce concise group reports that give their readers an up-to-date and credible overview of the positions 
of various stakeholders on a particular issue. As such, these reports may play an important role in 
consensus assessment and catalyzing societal conflict resolution. In earlier papers (de Moor, 2004; Heng & 
de Moor, 2003), the objectives, process models, functio ality, initial user experiences, and plans for the 
near future were described. We refer to this overview for more details, and only give a brief summary in the 
subsequent section.  
GRASS Functionality 
Group Report Structure 
Each GRASS group report is subdivided into three main p rts: (1) the problem description; (2) the 
sections; and (3) the report conclusion.  
The problem description contains an introduction of the problem domain, the central issue that is the 
focus of the report, and a list of one or more key questions. The sections form the body of the report, in 
which the actual discussion takes place. Each section omprises a section introduction, the key question to 
be examined as well as a number of positions that authors can take. For each position, arguments pro and 
contra can be entered. An argument can also be linkd to other arguments, thus forming an argument tree.
A section is ended by the section conclusion, in which the various positions to the key question are 
summarized.  
Each report is ended by a report conclusion, which summarizes the answers to the various key 
questions, and indicates areas for future research.  
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Fig. 2 The GRASS Tool 
GRASS Functionality 
A user has to register in order to become a report author. Several editor roles have been defined as 
well. Each editor role can be filled by one or more authors. Every author can become an editor, if desired. 
An overall report editor is responsible for editing the problem description and report conclusion parts. The 
report editor can also add new sections. A section editor is responsible for editing the section introduction 
and conclusion. In each section, authors can adopt or add new positions and add arguments, pro or con 
positions and other arguments. Positions taken can be modified continuously, reflecting a change in 
opinions held. Arguments, once made, cannot be changed, to prevent loss of discussion structure. An 
important feature of GRASS is that it stores all report elements in a database, which can be used to generate 
group reports in different formats. An example would be tailor-made summary reports  listing all issues that 
cause much discontent, as measured by large variations in positions adopted. Reports consisting of 
positions and attached argumentation could be further organized according to stakeholder roles played by 
the authors, for example by presenting positions adopted by environmental organizations versus those tak n 
by logging companies.  The tool also has advanced and customizable notification functionality, thus 
allowing for an increased awareness about changes being made in positions.  
GRASS has had a long gestation period, starting from an initial dissatisfaction with the limitations of 
e-mail for writing reports, via various intermediate prototypes, to the current version which is almost ready 
for large-scale use3 (Fig.2). The BCFOR case was ahead of its time, and l cked proper technological 
support for it to continue its mission. With this authoring technology finally reaching maturity, the time has 
come to build more systematic use cases. With the new version of the tool, experiments have been done in 
Dutch and US academic student settings to test and fine-tune the functionality. We are now planning to 
reach out beyond these rather limited usage contexts o more ambitious, real-world, GRASS-style cases.  
Coordinating Collaborative Work  
As we have seen, one characteristic of collaborative communities is that they aim to accomplish joint 
objectives through a process of members working together. Ngwenyama & Lyytinen (1997) provide the 
following definition of groupwork: “a web of coordinated social actions performed by the participants to 
                                                
3 http://grass-arena.net. 
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achieve a joint outcome."  This definition refers to coordinated action. Evidently, there are many kinds of 
coordination. According to Malone and Crowston (1994), coordination is “the act of managing 
interdependencies between activities performed to achieve a goal”. This is not very different from the other 
well-known definition of Holt (1988): “coordination is composing purposeful actions into larger purposeful 
wholes”. Coordination thus implies the existence of interdependencies, which can either be pre-given, or 
derive from the goal-directed effort. Malone and Crowston identify several types of interdependencies and 
coordination processes that are suitable in addressing these: 
 
Table 1: Classification of dependencies (Malone & Crowston, 1994) 
Dependency Examples of coordination processes 
• Shared resources “First come first serve”, priority order, budgets, 
managerial decisions (hierarchy), market-like 
bidding (markets) 
• Task assignments Same as shared resources 
• Producer / consumer relationships  
• Prerequisite constraints Notification, sequencing, tracking 
• Transfer Inventory management (e.g. “just in time”, 
“economic order quantity”) 
• Usability Standardization, ask users, participatory design 
• Design for manufacturability Concurrent engineering 
• Simultaneity constraints Scheduling, synchronization 
• Task / subtask dependencies Goal selection, task decomposition 
  
In a virtual collaborative community, we have to distinguish between two levels of dependencies. First, 
there are the dependencies between the stakeholders in the outside world that bring them together in the
community. In the BCFOR case, this dependency derives from the fact that the forests of British Columbia 
are a public good, and one way of using these often excludes or at least hampers another use. In other 
words, there is a single resource available to various actors with different interests. Second, there are 
dependencies created within the community by virtue of the collaboration. In the BCFOR case, these are 
dependencies that are part of the collaborative report writing and that can be of various kinds, if weuse the 
Malone and Crowston typology above. The longer people work together, the more of these dependencies 
will emerge and need to be satisfied by the communication system. For example, when collaborating on a 
group report, the overall goal is the report as a shared resource, but during the work, there will be a need for 
solving simultaneity constraints. Also, many producer/ onsumer relationships will emerge where one actor, 
e.g. with an editorial role, becomes dependent on another with an author role. 
In adversarial collaboration, the interactions aimed at dealing with these dependencies take the form of 
negotiation. According to Putnam and Roloff (1992),  negotiation is a special form of communication that 
centres on perceived incompatibilities and focuses on reaching mutually acceptable agreements. A common 
distinction is between distributive and integrative negotiation (Walton & McKersie, 1965).  The objective 
of distributive negotiation is to achieve an efficient compromise. The objective of integrative negotiation is 
to create a solution that satisfies all parties. Fiher and Ury (1981) made a similar distinction between win-
lose versus win-win negotiations and argue strongly in favour of the win-win approach.  
Weigand et al. (2003) discuss three types of negotiati n, based on the way of communicating: norm-
oriented, goal-oriented and document-based. In norm-oriented negotiation, the communication follows 
protocols or general rules that determine which communicative action is appropriate at a certain moment. 
In goal-oriented negotiation, the communication proceeds by disclosing and discussing the goals of the 
participants in an attempt to integrate them. Document-based negotiation makes use of a common 
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document; the participants do not interact directly, but by contributing to the evolution of the document as 
for example a business contract or a political press statement.   
Combinations of these types are possible, of course.  Like many collaborative work systems, the focus 
in the GRASS system is on document-based negotiation. The reason is that the norm-oriented negotiation 
assumes that there are fixed protocols with well-defined meanings, which is typically not the case in 
evolving communities. Although norm-oriented negotiation cannot be primary in adversarial collaboration, 
this does not mean that it plays no role or that norms are not important. To the contrary, selective usages of 
norm-oriented negotiation are indispensable in improving the quality and fairness of the collaboration 
process (we will come back on the issue of norms in ection 4). Goal-based negotiation can be quite 
effective in adversarial collaboration, as it can help the actors to not get stuck in positions by direct ng them 
back to the objectives behind the position. However, it assumes that the parties are willing to reveal (p rt 
of) their goals; and this willingness is something that can only grow over time. In sum, GRASS is primarily 
document-based, and in this way helps the opposed stakeholders to focus on a common objective, and thus
should be selectively complemented with other negotiati n forms. 
We have now explored the dimension of objectives in more detail. It is clear that there are many 
coordination complexities that need to be taken into account in the development of adequate supporting 
communication systems. However, as already hinted a by the interactions typically forming negotiation, 
paying sufficient attention to the various interests involved is essential as well. The fact that the public 
interest features prominently in such communities derves further treatment. 
Defining the Public Interest 
A good society recognizes the importance of the public domain, and invests heavily in creating a civil 
order that reflects good social relations. Notions f production and consumption, however, have obscured 
the importance of association--the creation of commn interests--as the basis of society. This associati n 
takes place in a good community, with mutual respect b tween different groups and lively dialogue about 
important issues (Jordan, 1989). It is not true that e public interest needs to suffer a tragedy of the 
commons by default. Very complex normative systems have evolved in many societies. For example, the 
elaborate system of rights and responsibilities which successfully governed the English medieval common 
for centuries was capable of preventing and dealing with major conflicts that would have otherwise 
threatened the public interest (Ridley, 1996).  
The question now is: how can successful adversarial collaborative communities for managing the 
public interest come to be? Why would their participants interact at all given that they all have their own 
interests and objectives, which somehow have to match for collaboration to emerge?  
To better understand how private and public interess can be made to agree, the concept of stakeholder 
needs to be worked out. Adversarial communities for the public interest are composed of many 
stakeholders. Stakeholders are those who have an interest in a particular decision, either as individuals or as 
representatives of a group (Digital Europe, 2003). From this definition, some factors can be derived that 
complicate effective communication among stakeholders. First, all parties have their private interests to 
defend. This may lead to actions such as secrecy (not revealing all information to other parties), advocacy 
(pushing their own position as far as possible), and discovery (strategic revelation of partial information) 
(Cohen et al., 2000). Depending on the language game being played, such strategic behavior may be 
legitimate, for example in a commercial transaction or legal dispute. However, stakeholders often defend 
their private interests in illegitimate ways, someti es even leading to sabotage of the collaborative process.   
Besides there being private interests, there is also  decision or public interest affecting all 
stakeholders. The public interest will only be safeguarded if an equitable and fair balance between th 
various stakeholder interests can be achieved (Plender, 1997).  However, when has such a balance been 
achieved? How can the end result be acceptable to all participants? Often, only an unsatisfactory 
compromise is achieved, in which one of the participants has illegitimately gotten the upper hand (Rieke & 
Sillars, 1984).   
Another factor complicating effective communication in adversarial communities for the public 
interest is that not all discussants are participating on their own behalf, but instead may represent the 
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interests of others. This means that additional confli ts may emerge and secondary communication 
processes may be necessary. 
Cohen et al. (2000) claim that in adversarial collabor tion the problem is the widely diverging goals. 
We argue, however, that in adversarial communities th  real problem is the disagreement between interests, 
not objectives. In BCFOR, agreement was reached quickly that writing a joint group report by means of a 
fair process, was a good way of building common ground. However, it was considered to be very important 
that the process in which this objective was to be achieved would be legitimate. The main issues of con lict 
and confusion thus revolved around how to balance the interests.   
To position communities for a public interest in which effective communication is important, we 
classify communities along two dimensions. The first s whether interests of community members are 
mainly shared or opposed. We call these communities harmonious and adversarial, respectively. The 
second dimension relates to the objectives. If there is just discussion without collaboration, we call these 
communities of interest, while collaborative communities aim to accomplish shared objectives, such as the 
authoring of a group report. Our main focus in thispaper is on adversarial collaborative communities, since 
these are essential for creating win-win situations between opposing parties.   
To clarify the classification: we consider each of these two dimensions of interests and objectives to be 
a continuum:  Interests can be more or less shared. At the one end of the continuum, interests are opposed, 
at the other end they are shared. Similarly, objectiv s can range from individual objectives only to 
completely joint objectives. 
Fig. 3 Positioning adversarial collaborative communities 
 
In Fig. 3, we have positioned four real communities in terms of the two classification dimensions. 
Ranging from less to more discordant, these are: 
Shared interests / individual objectives. These are communities where interests overlap, but no 
collaboration takes place. A typical example would be the World Wildlife Fund Ranger Club4. This is a 
club for and by children who share an - often passionate - interest in nature conservation. The focus is on 
information exchange and learning via discussion fora. There are also possibilities to get involved in 
actions. These are mostly oriented towards individual participation, however. For example, participants can 
send e-mails or donate money to support a particular onservation campaign.  
Shared interests / shared objectives.  This is the situation where members have joint interests and 
collaborate on common goals. In general, these communities are more discordant than the previous type, 
because the working together leads to dependencies, for example concerning reputation and finances, that 
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may lead to misunderstandings and tensions.  A typical example is the Friends of the Earth Internationl 
(FoEI) campaign communities (Kleef & de Moor, 2004). FoEI is a network of 68 environmental 
organizations worldwide, each working in its own country with local, community-based groups active in 
civil society (around 5,000 local groups in total). It is a grassroots network, where decisions are made by 
consensus, and work and authority are decentralized as much as possible. Campaigns are organized by 
communities of people working for FoEI member organiz tions. Thus, they share similar interests related 
to sustainable development and have common objectives, as many campaigns can only succeed by joining 
forces.  Still, interests and objectives do not completely overlap, as to a certain extent they compete for the 
same public attention.     
Opposed interests / individual objectives. In these communities, there often is the problem of strongly 
conflicting interests. One such community was BCFOR in its early stage. All members of the community 
shared their focus on the problem domain of B.C. forestry. They had very little shared interests, however. 
Also, there were no truly joint objectives, as the group mainly conducted nonfacilitated, divergent 
discussion. 
Opposed interests / shared objectives. This is potentially the most discordant type of community. Not 
only do interests not agree, but those conflicts of interest will feature more prominently when members - 
try to - work together on shared objectives. BCFOR in its later stage was an example of such a community.  
In this stage, their interests were still as opposed as before. However, they now had a common objective: 
the writing of the group report. When working together, lack of trust is often a major problem. 
Having positioned and illustrated communities for the public interest, we can now investigate the 
norms governing their communication processes in more detail. To theoretically ground this investigation, 
we look into various discourse ethics theories. 
 
From Discourse Ethics Theory to Communication Norms 
As we have seen earlier, Ngwenyama & Lyytinen (1997) defined groupwork to be a web of 
coordinated social actions performed by the participants to achieve a joint outcome. However, they also
claim that the social actions of groupwork are situated within and normatively regulated by the 
organizational context. Especially in virtual adversarial collaborative communities, where there is potential 
or actual conflict and many additional problems arise due to limited social context cues because of the 
medium, it is important to realize what the regulating norms and motives are. In addition, note that “the 
organizational context” in this case is typically not a hierarchical organization but a loosely coupled 
community. We said that in adversarial collaborative communities essential interests are conflicting, yet 
simultaneously there are shared objectives (“mixed-motive tasks”). In such a context, the design of 
interactions and supporting systems needs to be donvery carefully (Whitworth & de Moor, 2003). Harris 
(1995) discusses some theories of  “universal pragmatics”,  in particular Grice’s maxims and Habermas’ 
theory in this area. Harris concludes that the usefuln ss of Grice’s work is limited, and that the work f 
Habermas is more promising, especially because of its political grounding.  This paper follows Habermas’ 
direction.  
Discourse Ethics 
As is well known, Habermas proposed a series of validity claims which act as a set of general 
principles on which all communication is based and which where necessary can be called into question and 
“redeemed” by the other parties. These validity claims are based on comprehensibility (related to linguistic 
competence), truth (agreement on truth claim with respect to the object world), truthfulness (agreement on 
speaker’s sincerity) and rightness (agreement on normative social rules and relationships). The validity 
claims presuppose shared understanding (agreement or consensus on a situation definition) as the first 
premise of communication. 
Habermas’ concept of discourse ethics (Habermas, 1984, 1990) contains general rules for practical 
discourse leading to an ideal speech situation, in particular in situations of moral argumentation. The 
process of moral argumentation is particularly relevant to situations where social conflicts arise and to 
institutional discourse (Harris, 1995). These rules guarantee discursive equality, freedom and fair play by 
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not excluding anybody from participating, and by allowing them to challenge anything they deem 
important, while ensuring that nobody is prevented from exercising these rights. However, an important 
question is how to translate these ideals into actual s pport for conversation in the real world (Chambers, 
1996; Froomkin, 2003).  
Habermas’ discourse ethics are grounded in his theory of communication. Interestingly, the 
communication setting presupposes certain basic rules, even if in practice, we see these rules often violated. 
As Habermas claims, there is a “common core of morality in the normative pre-suppositions of 
communicative interaction” (Habermas, 1990). The basic rule is that participants must respect each other as 
communication subjects. It means that one must be abl  to give valid reasons for the communicative 
actions that one performs. This applies to both the sp aker and hearer role. The speaker is not obliged to 
reveal everything she knows or wants, but when asserting something, or requesting some action, she should 
be able to give a valid reason (for each validity claim). The hearer is not obliged to agree with everything 
the speaker says, but he should listen and be willing to indicate whether he agrees or not (and why).  A 
further important rule implicit in the communicative setting is that in principle, the communication is to be 
interpreted in the context of the communication, which sometimes can mean complete confidentiality, in 
other times giving the whole world access to the discussion. Exporting statements to other contexts cannot 
be done without the consent of the communicative actors. Within the context, however, communication 
should always be completely transparent. This list of rules is not meant to be exhaustive, but gives a good 
starting point for analysis.   
Habermas makes a distinction between communicative action and strategic action, although he 
qualified this distinction in later work. In communicative action, the coordination that is achieved is based 
on a shared situation definition, whereas in strategic action, the coordination is achieved as a result of the 
individual actions of the participants pursuing their own goals, taking into account their expectations f the 
other participants’ goals, and the signals they get about these via the actions of the other. Although this 
distinction makes sense at a conceptual level, it is not so easy to recognize it in practice (Harris, 1995). For 
one thing, it does not mean that participants in communicative action necessarily pursue a common goal
and participants in strategic action private goals, or that the goals are harmonious in one case and 
conflicting in the other. Also in the case of an adversarial discourse situation, the participants can
coordinate their dependencies by means of communicative ction. In this respect, we do not agree with 
Ngwenyama and Lyytinen (1997) for whom negotiation necessarily implies strategic action.  
The distinction can also not be based on the linguistic form of the messages, or the use of so-called 
cooperative speech acts, although these may give indications on the attitude of the participants. However, 
what we can do is to translate the ideals of discourse ethics into practical rules, and we can check whether 
these rules (communication norms) are adhered to ornot. Therefore we propose the following criterion n 
this paper: a discourse is called communicative action if it follows the communication norms that are 
legitimate to the community, and is called strategic action if there is a norm violation. In other words, 
communication norms, properly defined, are a means by which communicative action can be promoted and 
strategic action resisted. In the next section, we will illustrate the concept of communication norms through 
the example of GRASS. 
Communication Norms in GRASS 
Central in the group report authoring process is that ere is some issue or topic being addressed in a 
process of argumentation between different participants. To ensure that discussion contributes to the 
common good, and does not become pathological, its social context needs to be clearly understood. After 
all, public discourse is about making an argument for a point of view, not having an argument (Tannen, 
1998).  Although discussion and debate may be relativ y unproblematic as descriptions of interpersonal 
communication and opinion formation in small face-to-face groups, these processes need to be carefully 
designed when applying them to the larger-scale processes of public opinion formation (Price, 1992). 
Group report authoring, as a key form of interaction in adversarial collaborative communities, therefor  
requires that the definitions of its design characteris ics are sensitive to the social, or even societal context. 
Using discourse ethics theory, Heng and De Moor (2003) formulated several key design principles for 
communications systems for group report authoring. Some of the most important ones are: 
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DP1: the document should be neutral and transparent, r porting all the undistorted views of all the 
participants of the discussion. 
DP2: participants should take on responsibility. 
DP3: the goal is not contrived conclusions, but true consensus. 
To operationalize the design principles, explicit communication norms need to be formulated. Such 
norms on the one hand project the expected patterns fo  interaction that participants can use to anticipate, 
understand, and coordinate their interaction. On the ot er hand, they can be used to implement and exercise 
normative control. Thus, the norms designed into a c mmunication support system can have a direct impact 
on the outcomes of the communication and collaboration process (Aakhus, 1999; Lessig, 1999).   
In the GRASS case, communication norms define acceptable communication behavior for actors 
playing a role in the authoring process. Each norm has a deontic effect, indicating whether something may, 
must, or may not happen. Some norms focus on actor roles, others on document elements, and again others 
on norms for the interaction processes between actors. GRASS incorporates many communication norms, 
to implement the various design principles. To illustrate, we describe the norms that implement DP1:  
Neutrality 
CN1: Any interested user may register as an author. 
CN2: Any author may play any editor role. 
CN3: If more than one author plays a particular editor role, all authors playing that role must agree 
before any change to a report element they are responsible for may be made.  
CN4: Any dispute related to the authoring process may always be discussed by all authors in a public 
forum to which every author has access.  
CN5: Any common report element (such as report or section conclusions), after having been drafted by 
its responsible editors, must be approved by every author.  
Transparency 
CN6: No unauthorized changes may be made to any report lement. 
CN7: All authors must be notified of any relevant report element changes.  
CN8: All reports and their composing elements may be read by any user. This reader does not have to 
be an author. 
In the case that one of these norms is violated, for example, if not all authors are notified of a relevant 
element change (CN7) or if a user is not allowed to register as an author (CN1), this is an instance of a
(conscious or non-conscious) strategic action. One way to avoid strategic action is to implement the norms 
into the system, so that it is impossible to violate the norms. Of course, this is not possible for every norm, 
and even if it is possible, it may have undesirable side effects. Still, it is worth keeping in mind tha  
communication systems not only offer technical functionality (writing, e-mailing etc), but, through their 
functionalities, also can be used as normative system  for guiding behaviour. (Lessig, 1999) 
 
Communication Systems Design 
In this section, we first give a brief overview of some communication systems for adversarial 
collaborative communities. We then briefly discuss the role that communication norms could play in their 
design. 
CSCW and Communication Systems  
Traditionally, so-called Computer-Supported Cooperative Work (CSCW) and Group Decision Support 
Systems (GDSS) failed to take into account the politica  aspects of group work. (Bannon, 1997). Too often, 
the assumption was made that group work is always harmonious and information is a neutral concept. 
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However, most information is subject to strategic misrepresentation and unconscious bias (March, 1991). 
Disclosing information is also not neutral and it cannot be expected that subjects disclose something if they 
do not see the benefit of that disclosure for themselves. In a study by Lyytinen et al. (1993) about the use of 
GDSS tools for diplomats, it was found that the tool had to be used in a non-standard way if it was to be 
used at all. Firstly, it was out of the question to use anonymous communication, which is often favoured in 
the GDSS literature for group brainstorming and voting. Secondly, the archival properties of the system 
should be used with great care, as the participants did not want to make any statement during the 
discussions if they knew that their explicated views ere stored and could be used to pin them down later 
on what were only intermediate positions.  
One step on the way to the design of effective communication systems for adversarial collaborative 
communities is the idea of issue-based information systems (IBIS). Whereas GDSS focus on supporting the 
process of group decision making, IBIS allow for the structuring, analysis and elaboration of complex, 
multiple-perspective issues, all of which is essential for dealing with complex societal problems without 
clear and singular solutions.  
Issues act as organizing principles for collaborative work, transcending individual conversations 
(Hartfield & Graves, 1991). An IBIS allows its user to identify questions, develop the scope of positions in 
response to them, and assists in creating discussions (Kunz & Rittel, 1970). Using an IBIS, stakeholders 
can conduct conversations about complex or ‘wicked' problems, by structuring the creation and handling of 
‘issue nets' (Conklin & Begeman, 1989). Issue nets have three main types of nodes: issues, positions, and 
arguments. Many refinements of nodes and the types of links have been created in the applications 
developed. Some IBIS are generic and domain-independent, while others are tailored to the needs of a 
particular domain.  
Examples of early generic IBIS-tools are gIBIS and HyperIBIS. gIBIS is a graphical hypertext system 
with as its main interface elements a browser and a structured node index (Conklin & Begeman, 1989). 
HyperIBIS is a simple text version of an IBIS, whic an distinguish between deontic issues (should?), 
factual issues (what?), instrumental issues (how?), explanatory issues (why?) and conceptual issues 
(definitions) (Isenmann, 1993). One domain-specific IBIS, especially designed for research purposes is the 
Scientific Collaboration System (Kim, Suh, & Whinston, 1993). SCS pays much attention to representing 
knowledge. It uses an ordinary database to store this knowledge and make it accessible to its users. Types 
defined include hypothesis, claim, and argument. It allows research fields to be modeled as object classes, 
and organizes these fields in a class hierarchy. Issue nets are then mapped to one or more of these 
hierarchies. Queries on this knowledge base enable, for xample, interdisciplinary viewpoints on the same 
problem to be obtained. 
 These early IBIS systems focused much attention on developing and using – often complex – 
representations. Only little attention was paid to the way in which these systems were to be used, let alone 
how they could be made effective. This is changing, as modern IBIS become more sensitive to their context 
of use. Zeno, for instance, is a second-generation, Web-based IBIS tool (Gordon, Karacapilidis, & Voss, 
1996) which helps to mediate in conflicts. One purported application is that it can be used to democratize 
public policy making processes. A human mediator indexes documents according to the underlying 
argumentation model. By allowing for the preferences and value judgments expressed in messages to be 
modeled and by using a reason maintenance procedure, the tool can indicate which of the alternative 
solutions proposed meet selected proof standards or decision criteria. Although still using complex 
representation and reasoning schemes, Zeno pays much ore attention to usability issues than the earlir 
generation of IBIS tools. It meets several practical design requirements: widely available across platforms, 
inexpensive access, and a very intuitive user interfac .   
Zeno is a sophisticated tool with the clear purpose of supporting planning processes. In contrast, D3E5 
is a whole kit of functionalities, which allows user  to build their own document authoring tools. It supports 
the creation of sites that can be used to publish web-based documents, and that have integrated discourse 
facilities and interactive components (Sumner & Shum, 1998).  
Along these lines, new, customized forms of online-publication processes can be conceived which 
involve authors and readers in the review process much more interactively. GRASS can be seen as an 
                                                
5 http://d3e.open.ac.uk 
Virtual Adversarial Collaborative Communities 129 
 
another example of this next-generation IBIS tools. Its main contribution is not so much in the discussion 
and authoring functionalities themselves, but in its capability to be molded to the communication norms of 
the community. Over the years, GRASS has continuously evolved these norms (De Moor and Aakhus, 
2003). The theoretical lens outlined in this paper can help to analyze and further refine these systems, 
possibly leading to new classes of functionalities-in-context.   
Although the Internet has great potential for increasing the quality of democratic life, not much 
attention has been paid so far to the systematic design of communication systems for the public good. As 
Noveck states: “There is a marked absence of spaces for deliberative, independent, thoughtful dialogue 
among ‘wired’ citizens, confronting new ideas and peo le in the course of civil conversation.” 
Accordingly, “we need to devise a ‘public architecture’ in cyberspace to take advantage of the 
communications potential” (Noveck, 2000).  
Our call for basing communication systems on key design principles and derived communication 
norms could be helpful in drawing up such an architecture.  Granted, we only outlined elements of the 
theoretical lens, its translation into design principles and communication norms, and its implementation 
into concrete communication systems. Our point was not to come up with a fully developed, 
operationalized, and tested theoretical framework f spanning the communication theory-system design 
practice divide. Rather, our more modest goal was the necessary, preceding step: making the case for the 
need for such a bridge between communication theory and systems design, listing its elements and 
sketching a possible approach for its construction. Future research will have to address many detailed 
issues: what communication theories are relevant for virtual adversarial collaborative communities? Can 
universal design principles be distilled out of these theories or is their design mostly situated? How to map 
between design principles and communication norms? How to deal with conflicting communication norms?  
Can the functionalities of communication technologies be classified according to how well they satisfy 
such norms? How to use such new kinds of classifications to inform the research and development of new
categories of communication systems?  And so on. 
The newer generations of communication tools are gettin  increasingly sophisticated in their support 
for adversarial collaborative communities. However, the theoretical grounding for many of these methods 
is still unclear. By analyzing their implicit communication norms using a discourse ethics-like theoretical 
lens, potential sources of conflict and communication distortions can be detected. This may help improve 
the diagnosis of existing systems (“why did this collaboration fail?”) and the design of new systems that 
better match communicative ideals (Hirschheim & Klein, 2003).  
We have only presented a small sample of ‘constitutional’ norms, which are directly derived from 
Habermas’ discourse ethics. Many other ‘bylaw’ norms could be conceived, for example to deal with the 
drawbacks of efficiency and time-constraints, which discourse ethics does not address. One efficiency norm 
could be to allow only a limited amount of space to make one’s argument, or a certain deadline before 
which an argument must have been made. Other issues, ch as group cohesion, leadership, and socio-
emotional issues also need to be represented in norms and ensuing designs in order to build truly usefl 
systems. Group dynamics theory and the literature on computer-mediated communication  (e.g. (Forsyth, 
1983; Sudweeks & Rafaeli, 1996)),  amongst much other work, can be a source for these additional design 
constraints. These efficiency, group, and design aspect , however, are outside of the direct scope of this 
paper, although they need to be addressed in future wo k.  
Design choices will not be trivial and often difficult trade-offs will be necessary. For example, 
traditional GDSS systems often favour anonymous discus ions, to increase productivity and sometimes also 
to de-politicize the discussion. In adversarial communities, anonymity must be used with care, however. 
For example, in an IBIS kind of system, it may be possible to anonymize the issue list, since every 
participant is allowed to raise an issue, and if it is deemed relevant by one participant, that is sufficient for 
including it. However, anonymizing the claims can severely hamper effective discussion, because if 
someone makes a claim, he or she should be ready to support it. This also applies to counter-arguments. 
This example makes clear that the design of a complex communication system that is both useful and 
legitimate is not straightforward.  
We already stressed the trust-building function of legitimate public communication systems. This trust 
is not only important for making public discourse more credible. It can also benefit the standing of the
participating stakeholders. Legitimacy and accountabili y of participants in societal debates, such as non-
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governmental organizations, requires a careful design of their information and communication systems. 
Careful analysis of which norms to apply and how these norms are to be embedded in concrete system 
functionality is essential for this purpose (Vedder, 2003; Whitworth & de Moor, 2003).  
Of course, there is a potential danger in prescribing communication behaviors through rigidly designed 
systems (Suchman, 1994). However, provided that sufficient criteria are given for which norms to make 
explicit, and that degrees of freedom are left where possible, making norms explicit can actually promote 
emancipatory discourse by improving legitimacy, accountability, and usefulness in communication system 
for distributed discourse (Noveck, 2000; Vedder, 2003; Winograd, 1994). 
Although we have focused on virtual communities for the public interest, lessons learnt here should 
have wider applicability. For example, adversarial communities also exist in legal conflicts, where lawyers 
of different parties often have to work together on resolving a dispute. An interesting case is also formed by 
the so-called Alternative Dispute Resolution initiat ves that try to mediate in a conflict between individuals 
before it must be raised to the legal level. Virtual adversarial collaborative communities, and their properly 
designed communication support systems, may be very useful for supporting such initiatives.  
 
Conclusions 
We started this paper by acknowledging the importance of virtual communities for the public interest. 
In these types of communities it is important to clear y identify the degree to which objectives and 
especially interests of community members agree. Based on these dimensions, communities can range from 
the harmonious to the adversarial, and from communities of interest to truly collaborative communities. In 
this paper, we focused on adversarial collaborative communities, as these are essential instruments for 
societal conflict resolution and change.     
We claim that to assess the value of communication systems for virtual communities, it is not 
sufficient to merely look at functionality. First, it is necessary to determine the characteristics of the 
collaboration required in the community. Subsequently, key design principles and selected communication 
norms need to be made explicit and used to inform the design and diagnosis of the communication systems 
for such communities.  We illustrated our ideas by examining the role communication norms played in a 
case study on group report authoring support systems,  
Much attention in Community Informatics is paid to closing the Digital Divide. However, the 
Theoretical-Empirical Divide is receiving much less attention. Community theorists and practitioners still 
live in different worlds. Instead of seeing each oter as alien species, however, they need to work together 
much more closely. Reflection needs to meet lived experience. By systematically linking communication 
theoretical analysis with practical systems design, implementation and evaluation activities, more effective 
communication systems can be built. Though not sufficient, this definitely is a necessary condition for
more successful virtual adversarial collaborative communities. We hope that our proposed outline of a 
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